Consciousness and the real world
The New York Times recently reprinted an essay by Galen Strawson. Read it here:
Strawson Essay
I don’t usually review articles, but this one is I think worth reading. Strawson’s argument reverses the commonplace conception of what we know and don’t know about reality.
Briefly, this is how I interpret his thesis: The Hard Problem is not Consciousness. It’s Physical Reality. Physics offers an incomplete view of reality. It tells us how reality works, but it does not and it cannot tell us what reality is. This point was commonplace 100 years ago, Strawson writes, but it has gotten lost in the recent discussion of consciousness. Stephen Hawking makes this point dramatically in his book A Brief History of Time. Physics, he says, is “just a set of rules and equations.” The question is what “breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?” What is the fundamental stuff of physical reality, the stuff that is structured in the way physics reveals? The answer, again, is that we don’t know — except insofar as this stuff takes the form of conscious experience.
So the hard problem is the problem of matter (physical stuff in general). If physics made any claim that couldn’t be squared with the fact that our conscious experience is brain activity, then I believe that claim would be false. But physics doesn’t do any such thing. It’s not the physics picture of matter that’s the problem; it’s the ordinary everyday picture of matter. It’s ironic that the people who are most likely to doubt or deny the existence of the conscious self (on the ground that everything is physical, and that consciousness can’t possibly be physical) are usually also those who are most insistent on the primacy of science, because it is precisely science that makes the key point shine most brightly, the point that there is a fundamental respect in which the ultimate intrinsic nature of the stuff of the universe is unknown to us — except insofar as it is consciousness.
First, it reminds us that physics itself is motivated by a desire to make sense of our conscious experience. The fact that our models become ever more abstract, that they become “sets of rules and equations”, is a side effect of the experimental process that we believe yields objectively true insights. (3)
Secondly, it validates the empirical stance. We test accounts of reality, no matter how abstruse or abstract, against our own experience. “Truth” is the feeling we have that what’s being said corresponds to reality as we perceive it. This applies as much to the most mystical theology as to the most concrete engineering problem. It applies as much to the silliest confabulations as to the most tested and proven theory.
“The truth is out there” undergirds all our sense of reality. But we know the truth only by sensing congruences between different experiences, both remembered by ourselves and shared with others. Whatever is “out there” will forever be a mystery. That was Plato’s point in his image of the cave. His mistake was to believe that reasoning could access the reality outside the cave. He began the line of thought that ends with the blithe assumption that the “sets of rules and equations” describe reality not only more accurately but more completely than the accounts of our subjective experience.
There’s an irony here: The more we try to understand the nature of reality, the more we retreat from it. As Russel commented, in mathematics we know whether what we are saying is true, but we don’t know what it’s about; while in poetry we know what we are talking about, but we don’t know whether what we are saying is true.
With all its quirks and imperfections, the world presented by our conscious experience is the only reality we know.
Footnote 1: There is a difference between a scale model of a steam locomotive that runs on a steam, and a full size replica of the same locomotive. The model’s boiler, for example, will have to have thicker than scale walls, else it cannot sustain the necessary steam pressure. The model will not accelerate and decelerate in scale proportion, because its power to mass ratio will be different. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LNER_Peppercorn_Class_A1_60163_Tornado
Footnote 2: Nineteenth century theories of bridge behaviour were incomplete enough that many bridges fell down, and many people died. The real bridge does not behave exactly as modelled, thus giving graduate students in engineering lots of opportunity to observe them and refine the models.
Footnote 3: Quoting Bertrand Russell, Strawson writes: “We know nothing about the intrinsic quality of physical events,” [Russell] wrote, “except when these are mental events that we directly experience.” In having conscious experience, he claims, we learn something about the intrinsic nature of physical stuff, for conscious experience is itself a form of physical stuff.
Edited 2022-09-23
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