Crazy for You

George Gershwin Crazy for You. (Great Performances, PBS 12 Jan 2000.) Revival at the Paperthin Theatre in New York, 1997ff.  A wonderfully polished version of this entertaining and charmingly silly story. Well-designed costumes, with just the right subtle exaggeration, impeccably timed dance and comic schticks, some of the best songs Gershwin ever wrote, and superior video techniques. One of the pleasures of the play are the allusions to other plays, movies, and songs. **** (2000)

The Sanctuary Sparrow

Ellis Peters The Sanctuary Sparrow (1983) Cadfael #7. A reread. A falsely accused jongleur, Liliwin, seeks sanctuary from the lynch mob. Cadfael eventually puzzles out the real robber/ murderer, and justice, after a fashion, is done. Like all Peters’ Cadfael books, this is a historical romance presented as a detective story. Although the characters show faults as well as virtues, Cadfael and Hugh Beringar (deputy sheriff of Shrewsbury) are a little too good to be true.
     Characterisation is somewhat Dickensian: characters are their quirks and faults and virtues, and little else. Unlike Dickens, Peters gives us very little of the characters’ inner lives, and contents herself with formulaic description. It works. Their language is of course pseudo-archaic, and that works, too. I think the image of the Middle Ages is too sanitised, despite the obvious brutalities. The TV series, because it could use visuals to generate atmosphere, presents a more believable image. This often seems to happen when entertainments are converted to TV. Multi-media are more efficient at creating the necessary sense of a complete world. Novels can do this, too, but romances are not novels; they don’t have the room to create a complete world. Perhaps this fact accounts for the popularity of series, for in a series each volume can add to the picture, and so expand the reader’s image of the fictive world. Very good of its kind. ***

The Malaise of Modernity (book)

Charles Taylor The Malaise of Modernity (1991) I read this over a couple of years, having bought it on the strength of hearing one of the CBC Ideas program that underlies this book. Taylor’s main points are: a) that the modern search for the authentic self is morally good; b) but that it is often understood as mere self-fulfilment, and so degenerates into self-indulgence or narcissism; c) that there will always be a tension between the desire for individual freedom and the need for a supportive community; d) that there is a danger that the search for authenticity will result in an atomistic, fragmented society; e) democracy requires both freedom for the individual to become a fulfilled person, and for the community to find common goals and values.
    It sounds to me very much like an attempt to reframe the Christian message of wholeness and healing into a humanistic ethos, and by and large Taylor succeeds. He does use a lot of words, though, and doesn’t use enough examples. The discussion is often too abstract, which makes the book heavy going - you constantly have to imagine actual situations, and test your image against Taylor’s discussion. Apart from that, it’s an important book, as they say, and should have a positive influence on the debate about self vs society.
     Footnote: Ashley McIsaac, in an interview about his profanity, etc, at a Year 2000 concert, 00-01-12, claimed that it’s his prerogative to do what he desires. He believes that being yourself means doing what you want. He hasn’t understood that promises or contracts are agreements to limit his actions to those he has agreed to. Taylor would hold him up as an example of horrible misunderstanding of what the ethic of authentic self means. *** (2000)

The Meaning of it All (book)

Richard Feynman The Meaning of it All (1963; publ. 1998)  The Dantz lectures at University of Washington. Great stuff., and worth rereading at regular intervals. Feynman can clarify what science is like no one else: The scientific attitude is admission of ignorance; the scientific method is to search for answers, but always knowing that they are wrong in some way that hasn't been discovered yet. Taken with Barrow's discussion of impossibility (Impossibility), and Green's discussions of string theory (The Elegant Universe), we realise that most of what there is we will never know. Sobering thought, and one that should be engraved on every citizen's mind, heart, and soul. Much of the mess we make or the troubles we bring upon ourselves come from the superstition that we can know for sure. Or: the things we can know for sure are often not worth knowing. Feynman also, and better than Dawkins, presents the sense of wonder that infuses the scientist's work. **** (1999)

The Pursuit of Love (book)

Nancy Mitford The Pursuit of Love (1934). Love tragedy, made interesting and touching by very good character drawing. One gets to care about these people, even though one also feels they are more than somewhat silly. But that very silliness is a reason for their endearing charm. They are so very much themselves, that one wishes the Universe weren't quite so hostile to fools. Not that their folly is harmless - they do cause emotional scars - but they are never mean. One cannot forgive meanness, especially when it is perpetrated for the loftiest motives. Such meanness is often recognised by the pomposity of the criminal, a fact which Mitford is very good at demonstrating. *** (1999)

The Nurture Assumption (book)

Judith Rich Harris The Nurture Assumption (1998) Harris attacks the assumption that we turn out the way we do because of our parents. It's not nurture by parents that determines our adult personality (and personal problems / successes), it's our peer group. She starts with a couple of obvious but unaddressed observations: 1) that children in fact live their lives with other children; and 2) that immigrant children adopt the language, dress and manners of their playmates, not their parents. (She has some wise things to say about this estrangement between immigrant parents and their children.)  On this foundation she builds a very persuasive case. Along the way she distinguishes between character (largely inborn), personality (largely acquired, and changeable), and the self (the result of socialisation.)
     Harris's theory is almost but not quite a theory of everything. She notes how the same-age peer-group is an effect of our modern civilisation, and that in earlier societies a child's peer group was multi-aged. The older kids pass on their culture to the younger ones in this case. In our case, the younger ones may as well be from different countries, they are so different from their older relatives and friends. (The Pokemon craze supports this: it's a 6-10 year old phenom, mostly.) She also notes that school success flows primarily from the values and attitudes of the peer group, not the parents. When a child lives in a homogeneous neighbourhood, where both parents and children are largely similar, the child will of course resemble its parents, not because parental culture is the molding force, but because the children's culture differs so little from that of their parents'. When the neighbourhood is culturally diverse, the children will adapt and create a culture of their own, and this may be radically different from that of their parents. Hence intergenerational conflict
     She does not ignore the effect of inheritance; in fact she claims that the investigators of inherited traits are the ones who produce the data that requires some other explanation(s) than the nurture assumption. And so on. Her theory is predictive. For example, twins raised apart should show more similarities when their peer groups are similar and fewer when they are different. This is borne out by the data. She claims that birth-order effects are real, but only within the family. IOW, people have different personalities in different social contexts. She does not deny the influence of parents, but notes that it is limited mostly to the family itself (ie, how the people get along as a family), in which parental influence competes with sibling influence; and for the rest it is indirect, in that the choice of where to live affects the peer-groups that will influence the child.
     I think her argument is plausible. Her smaller claim is that there is a lot more to human development than parental nurture; and she lists and explains the other influences. Her larger claim is that these other influences outweigh that of parents. I think she is right. The book is quite repetitious, since she builds her case from several different starting points. It could have done with some tables or graphs, or some appendices presenting the data. Nevertheless, this is an important book.  The nurture assumption is under attack from other quarters also. There is the danger that social scientists will create a new orthodoxy out of one or the other of the alternatives, however. **** (1999)
     Update 2012: It's now quite clear that nature vs nurture has always been a nonsensical dichotomy. Logic alone would dictate that conclusion: no observed trait can be wholly the product of either nature or nurture. When I first realised this, I thought the puzzle was how to assign proportionate influences to nature and nurture. Genetics has shown that this is a mistaken, or at least a misdirecting, question. Nature and nurture work together to produce any given trait or behaviour. The better question is how, not how much.

Impossibility (book)

John D. Barrow Impossibility (1998) There are several kinds of impossibility, but they fall into three groups. There is the practical impossibility, reflecting some limits to the resources we (or any other creature) can command. Then the nature of the Universe itself sets limits on the possible. And all logical systems above a certain level of complexity exhibit impossibilities.
     An example of practical impossibility is the solution of problems that would take more computing time than the lifetime of the Universe; another is travelling beyond the solar system. Whether the Universe has a beginning or not is an example of a question we cannot answer because, although we can specify what we should need to know in order to settle the question, we cannot get the necessary knowledge. An example of a logical impossibility is expressed in Godel's theorem, which states that any axiomatic system at least as complex as arithmetic contains statements whose truth or falsehood cannot be determined
     A more interesting example is Arrow's Impossibility theorem: as the number of candidates for office increases, the probability that there will be no majority winner. approaches certainty. What this means in practice is that whoever wins, most people wanted someone else. The result can be generalised to any situation with multiple, mutually independent choices . It also applies to sporting events. Where several teams compete for a championship, there is surprisingly large possibility that the winner can be (and often has been) beaten by one or more of the losers. With 8 teams, the odds of this happening are 1 in 3.
     Barrow is a somewhat turgid writer. There are irritating typographical errors throughout the book, mostly of the wrong-word variety; an effect of reliance on spell checkers. The book is heavy going in places. I have read similar discussions elsewhere, and so didn't get hopelessly lost, but anyone who hasn't at least a senior high school understanding of physics, logic, mathematics, and other disciplines will probably have trouble following some of Barrow's arguments. Nevertheless, it's worth reading, if only to disabuse one of the notion that all things are possible. Barrow's most subtle point is this: that impossibilities, the limits of action and knowledge, tell us more about the nature of our Universe than the possibilities do. *** (1999)

Update 2012: if quantum computers do become a reality, then the range of solvable problems will enlarge by many orders of magnitude. Then question then become which of these problems are worth solving, which may be impossible to answer without solving the problem.

Update 2019: Minor correcctions in style and spelling.