P D James Short Stories (The Mistletoe Murder, 2016)

P. D. James. The Mistletoe Murder (2016) ... and other stories. Like other successful mystery writers, P D James was asked to contribute to Christmas mystery story collections. Here we have four examples, and a short essay on the short story. The stories are nicely constructed, with plausible crimes and well paced discoveries of the perpetrators. As in James’s novels, the denouements are psychologically nuanced. James understood that the reasons for crime are more interesting than the crimes themselves. The artistic problem in writing a short story is to sketch the characters well enough that they are believable criminals. James also knows that discovering the criminal does not bring what’s labelled “closure”. The effects of crime spread like a stain though the family and community, and will affect lives long after the case files are closed. In one story, a death caused in all innocence leads to blackmail that lasts a lifetime.

A very good read. A nicely designed and made book, too. ****

Neanderthals are humans

More evidence  that Neanderthals were people like us. Doesn't look like  much, eh? It's a piece of string.

It takes a lot of insight to make string. You have to understand that twisting fibres together makes a stronger product. You have to see that string is useful for tying stuff. You have to have stuff that needs tying. And so on. Quite an achievement!

Now I know why I save string.

A Comment on Ayn Rand

(A repost with some amendments)

 Ayn Rand and her followers worship money. But her notions on money are such a muddled mix of insight and delusion that it's hard to know where to begin a rational critique. From the Ayn Rand lexicon (http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/money.html):

     Money is the tool of men who have reached a high level of productivity and a long-range control over their lives. Money is not merely a tool of exchange: much more importantly, it is a tool of saving, which permits delayed consumption and buys time for future production. To fulfill this requirement, money has to be some material commodity which is imperishable, rare, homogeneous, easily stored, not subject to wide fluctuations of value, and always in demand among those you trade with. This leads you to the decision to use gold as money. Gold money is a tangible value in itself and a token of wealth actually produced. When you accept a gold coin in payment for your goods, you actually deliver the goods to the buyer; the transaction is as safe as simple barter. When you store your savings in the form of gold coins, they represent the goods which you have actually produced and which have gone to buy time for other producers, who will keep the productive process going, so that you’ll be able to trade your coins for goods any time you wish.

    As soon as she leaves the standard definitions of money (means of exchange, store of value/savings), her key points drift into nonsense. One of these misleading notions is that gold has “tangible value”. Gold has no intrinsic value; its value as money is only and exactly what people believe it is. The Conquistadores could not understand how the value of gold among the Inca and other South American peoples could be so low. They looted the gold, took it home to Spain, and promptly caused ruinous inflation. It was only when Spain used its gold for external trading that it could be used as capital. So much for the intrinsic value of gold.

     The notion that money somehow buys time for future production misses the point. "Delayed consumption" is possible only when there is a surplus of goods or productive capacity. Money cannot create a surplus, nor is it needed to ensure that any surplus will be used. Humans have invented many ways of saving surpluses without money. What’s needed to create a surplus is a technology that multiplies the effect of human work, such as agriculture. What’s needed to delay its consumption is a system of values and customs that will ensure the surplus (such as grain) will be stored for later use and trade. Neither of these require money.

     Fact is, even today much trade is done without money. The basic rule of all trade is "mutual obligation". The members of families and social circles trade goods and services because sharing is one of the obligations of these social groups. They keep pretty close track of their trades, too. Exact matches aren’t required, but everyone is expected to share their goods and provide services as best they can.

     And like practically everybody, Rand misquotes St. Paul’s comment on money. Later in the article, she says, So you think that money is the root of all evil? . . .  Have you ever asked what is the root of money?

     St. Paul actually wrote, The love of money is the root of all evil. Look it up!

    Money is a way of making trade with strangers possible, and thereby creating mutual dependence. A very useful invention. Eg, just try to calculate how many people have been involved in producing a 98 cent ball point pen and making it available to you. It’s made of several kinds of plastics and metals, which had to be mined, refined, processed, and shaped. The pen had to be packaged, warehoused, transported, and shelved. Even in a small town where you know most people, you aren’t necessarily a close friend of the shop owners and staff, but they serve you all the same.

     A stranger is someone to whom you owe nothing, and vice versa. This makes interaction between strangers dangerous. Hence, all societies have had to invent ways of making at least temporary mutual obligation possible. Think of "guest right", for example. You not only have the right to stay among your hosts, they have an obligation to protect you. A pretty good deal; you’d better have some good stuff to trade with them.

     So why do all those strangers work to produce and deliver a cheap pen to you? Because money makes it not only possible to trade with people you will never see, it makes it easy to do so.

     Nowadays, money trades are used to measure economic activity. They’re totalled in the Gross Domestic Product, or GDP, a number of such incomplete, gappy data that it causes pernicious delusions. The worst of these is the belief that an ever-rising GDP means we’re getting richer. Yet every time there’s major storm destruction, there’s a spike in GDP in the following months and years as the damage is repaired. I don’t think having to repair storm damage is making us richer. Besides, even in our highly monetised economy, about 1/3rd of economic activity does not involve money. In pre-money times, that was 100%.

     There is one value to the GDP: it can tell you how much of your spending eventually ends up in various pockets. Eg, in Canada, we spend about 10% of our GDP on healthcare. Every time we spend a dollar, a dime wends it way to the healthcare providers. Some of it gets there via taxes, some via insurance payouts, some via personal spending. So we could describe our GDP in terms of these three types of spending, but then we wouldn’t know what exactly the taxes, insurance payouts, and personal spending bought. What the GDP means all depends on how you analyse it. And that means that people with different axes to grind will analyse it differently.

     Basic rule about money: Money and wealth flow in opposite directions. This should be obvious, but most people tend to think that more money means more wealth. Money is only potential wealth, a point Rand doesn’t get quite right either, although her notion of money as buying time for future production comes close. But anyone who’s lived through extreme inflation, or has absorbed the stories of the people who did, knows that money isn’t wealth.

     I think everybody needs a good introductory survey course in anthropology, to learn about all the ways humans have organised the production and distribution of goods and services. It might cure one of the notion that our current economic arrangements are somehow natural or god-given. For over 95% of our existence as a culture-creating species, we humans have had no money. Yet humans managed to produce the goods and provide the services they needed. It’s true that money, because it accelerated trade, and more importantly enabled trade with strangers, accelerated the creation of wealth. But trade, and its beneficial effects on wealth creation and cultural exchange, existed long before money.

     2013-03-11 / 2014-05-23 / 2015-11-07 / 2018-07-03 / 2019-10-15

The Fierce People

     Napoleon Chagnon. Yanomamö: The Fierce People (1968) In 1964 and 1965, Chagnon spent about 13 months with the Yanomamö. A PhD was one result. This Case Study in Cultural Anthropology is another. It’s aimed at students, hence a nice personal tone, with anecdotes about Chagnon's reactions to the people he came to know. He does the standard thing,  describing the people’s “adaptations” to their physical and social environments, their kinship structure, their myths, and their politics, which for the Yanomamö is primary. Their life focuses on gaining respect and power within their villages, trading and allying themselves with neighbouring villages, raiding their enemies, and as often as not betraying their allies.
     Physically and ecologically their life is hard. They build gardens, and must stay near them to protect them. New gardens must be built every four or five years. Their technology relies almost exclusively on the materials the jungle affords them. Villages trade goods with others, but more for political reasons than material need, since everybody can make what they need when they need it. Villages with European contacts have acquired steel and aluminum pots, knives, and other trade goods, which they trade with remote villages.
     But the most important currency is women. Their marriage rules are fairly complicated. Fathers and brothers have the right, individually and as a group, to decide with whom to trade a woman. A husband may trade one of his wives or give her away (usually to a younger brother). Marriage ties are more important than blood ties. Alliances between villages require the exchange of women. Raids are often done to abduct women. A man may be accepted into a village by marrying a local girl: her family become his allies, and he strengthens their group.
     Fierceness determines social and political status. Alliances between villages, created by hosting a feast, determine the political status and relative security of the villages. Fighting for status is expected and encouraged, but the various kinds of fight are carefully regulated to minimise bloodshed. Even so, while Chagnon provides no numbers, the death rate from manslaughter and murder must be evry high. (Other sources indicate that half of all male deaths are by violence).
     The daily routine of a man revolves around gardening and cooking, taking drugs, politics, occasional hunting, and fighting. and occasional raiding For a woman, it's gardening, cooking, childcare, making hammocks, foraging, and serving her husband. Both men and women will play with children, who for the most part are left to amuse themselvesuntil about 6 or 8 years old. Fights, raids, and feasting punctuate this life.
     Chagnon’s description of his life among the Yanomamö is vivid and personal. His technical discussion of their kinship system, and its effects on their politics, is clear. He is at pains to emphasise that marriage ties are more important than blood ties, most of the time. Marriage creates and preserves the lineage, and lineages are politically significant groups.
     Ok, that’s a summary of what I’ve learned, mistakes and all.
     What’s my impression of the Yanomamö? Schoolyard bullies. Boasting, with occasional violence to back up the boasts; anxiety about maintaining one’s reputation; accumulating as much treasure as possible; doing only necessary chores; and lazing about as much as possible: does that sound familiar? About the only thing that’s missing from the schoolyard is the explicit trade in women, but among high school students the charming bully gets the girls, so the difference isn’t as great as it might seem. In short: Yanomamö life is nasty, brutish, and short.
     The Wikipedia article notes disagreements with Chagnon’s take on Yanomamö culture. But the article contains enough reference to documented raids and massacres that the argument that the Yanomamö are basically just as kind and loving as other tribal people sounds like special pleading. I think that Chagnon’s account is plausible. The Yanomamö really are more concerned with their violent notions of male honour than most peoples are. But keep in mind that violence and male honour are linked in every human culture. That suggests that the  Yanomamö are merely an extreme example of a human constant, of species-specific behaviour.
     More thoughts on violence, honour, and the Yanomamö are found on The Art of Manliness.
     Chagnon writes well. The book includes a good selection of photographs and diagrams. **½

Humankind's Most Dangerous Invention: A Short History of Progress (Wright)

   

Pithy quote

 Ronald Wright. A Short Illustrated History of Progress (2006) A paperback version of Wright’s 2004 book, with pictures, and coloured pages with pithy quotes displayed in large type. The book doesn’t need these gimmicks, it’s compulsively readable. Wright’s thesis is that civilisation is a trap. He’s an archeologist/anthropologist. He uses “civilisation” to mean a large complex culture based on the domestication of plants, animals, and human beings. A civilisation is marked by hierarchies, administrative complexity, specialisation of work, politics, etc.
     Almost every civilisation we know of has ended destroying itself. The type example of this process is Easter Island, which hosted a simple civilisation which at its peak fed around 10,000 people, but which collapsed when the people focussed on making gigantic statues. The statues which were supposed to prevent what we would now call ecological collapse. It didn’t work, and when Europeans made contact with Easter Island, there were about 1,000 nearly-starving people and a couple of hundred statues left on a treeless, rapidly eroding hunk of rock. To counter the argument that Easter Island culture wasn’t really a civilisation and so cannot stand as a warning, Wright looks at the first city-based civilisation, Sumer, which did the same damage to its ecology as the Easter Islanders did. It just took them longer. The successors to Sumer pretty well all made the same mistakes: Assyria, Babylon, etc, now exist only in clay tablets and stone statuary.
     Jared Diamond wrote a longer (and gloomier) meditation on the same themes as Wright (whose book began as a series of Ideas programs on CBC). Wright’s book is a much better read,  Diamond’s book provides more data. They both come to the same conclusion: “Civilisation” is humankind’s greatest and most dangerous invention. If we don’t learn from past experiments, we’ll destroy our civilisation, too. Because it’s a world-wide one, the collapse will entangle a larger swath of the ecosystems on which we depend, and which we persist in either ignoring, or see as an obstacle to further progress.
     Recommended. ****

L'Amour Tries Pulp Crime: The Hills of Homicide

      Louis L’Amour. The Hill of Homicide (1983) L’Amour’s authorised collection of detective stories, issued because an unauthorised edition of out-of-copyright stories was issued by another publisher. L’Amour was trying to protect his brand, but this collection doesn’t do much for it. The stories are workmanlike pulp, but that’s all. L’Amour acknowledges that his stories aren’t the same quality as those of the masters.
      Two things stand out: L’Amour likes to describe fist fights, “wicked rights” and all. The two most successful tales are about bent cops. Otherwise, it’s formula all the way, including sexy women that utter wise-crack come-ons to close off the stories. These stories are merely average.  I prefer L’Amour’s westerns. **

How toTell a Story: Massey Lectures 2003 by Thomas King

 
   Thomas King. The Truth About Stories: A Native Narrative (2003 Massey Lectures) A book worth reading. My take-away:
     We are our stories. But few of us are willing to accept that, until perhaps someone we know loses their stories as they fade into dementia. But a tribe or nation also is its stories. The stories we tell each other makes us a family, a village, a tribe, a nation. The stories others tell about us impinge on, intersect with, and conflict with the stories we tell about ourselves. If we have no stories of our own, or if no one listens to our stories, the stories told by others prevent them from seeing us as we see ourselves, seeing ourselves as we are.  That’s why being heard, being able to tell our stories, matters, even though story cannot change the past, for telling our stories will affect the future. It will change how the teller and the hearer tell the stories to come.
     King begins every lecture with the story of the Earth resting on the back of a turtle. What holds up the turtle? “It’s turtles all the way down.” Then he tells stories loosely organised around a theme or topic. He ends each lecture with “But don’t say in the years to come that you’d have lived you life differently if only you had heard this story. You’ve heard it now.”
     This series of narratives is I think the seed for The Inconvenient Indian. King is one of the wisest people I have ever met. I’d like to meet him in person. Read the book. ****
     You can listen to the lectures here: 2003 Massey Lectures

Misplaced Advice: For Her Own Good (Ehrenreich & English)

     Barbara Ehrenreich & Deirdre English. For Her Own Good (1978 & 2005) The subtitle reads Two Centuries of the Experts’ Advice to Women. It looks like the authors have read just about every piece of advice ever written. The notes to the chapters are extensive: there is a reference for every quotation and assertion. The book is a model of how to tell a history of ideas. The Woman Question arose when the roles of men and women in the family and society were eroded when the Industrial Revolution changed the economic function of the family, which changed from the primary supplier of daily needs to become the place of respite and recuperation from labour. The market came to dominate the economy.
     When a man’s role became that of the wage earner whose income would be used to buy what hitherto had been made by the family, his wife no longer had an economic function. There resulted more or less frantic, and in hindsight ridiculous, attempts to find a role for Woman outside the market economy, which meant in practice confining her to the home and redefining her role within it in terms of human relationships instead of economic value. The justifications danced around the idea that women were too weak, too emotional, too irrational etc to be trusted with work and power outside the home.
     The authors show how initially there was a concerted effort to eliminate women’s economic value. It was easy enough to transfer manufacture from the home to the factory. It was much harder to transfer women’s value as healers, and effort that began well before the industrial revolution, because womens’ power to heal threatened the hegemony of the celibate male church hierarchy. The story of how it was done is painful to read.
     Once women were transformed into consumers rather than producers, the problem became that of keeping them happy and satisfied. It was the upper and upper middle classes that first had to deal with the problem of the idle wife whose lack of economic and productive value naturally caused more or less painful psychosomatic suffering. The puzzle was how to make a woman feel useful when she obviously wasn’t, and worse, knew that she wasn’t. She became the Angel in the Home, the quasi-mother that comforted her husband when he returned from the cruel world of economic battle. She became the Hand the Rocked the Cradle. And so on.
     It all makes for an odd mix of depressing and entertaining reading, the effect of amazingly obtuse ideas and sentiments expressed by men (and a few women) who really should have known better. The authors give us large swatches of quotations and paraphrases from the experts’ advice books and articles. The book is worth reading for these alone.
     In an afterword written in 2004, Ehrenreich and English point to the economic emancipation of women, which has of course changed the problem once again. Now that women are no longer economically dependent on men, there is no reason to fabricate some essential role for her in marriage and the family. This of course brings with it a whole new range of issues: For if marriage and family are no longer one of the main, if not the main, purposes of growing up, what is the role of men and women? We shall see, and no doubt a generation or two from now, somebody will write a book about how the Woman Question morphed in the Life Question. I hope they do as good a job as Ehrenreich and English.
     Highly recommended. ****
Footnote: Women's and men's changing economic roles also transformed marriage. Marriage had been a primarily economic institution. As its economic value diminished, marriage became a private and personal relationship. So much so that these days people generally view an "arranged marriage" as inferior, since in such a marraige status and economics count for more than personal feelings. [20191030]

Fashion

      Lapham’s Quarterly VIII/4: Fashion Lewis Lapham, sometime editor of Harper’s, has persuaded a number of friends to finance his eponymous periodical. Each issue offers text and pictures about a single topic. I subscribe to it, and dip into my copies from time to time. This one I read all the way through, perhaps because I had aspirations to dandyism at one time (which competing interests and lack of money fortunately prevented me from realising). Or perhaps because the collection of writings and images, spanning some 3000 years, prove that clothing, understood as adornment of the body, is a species-defining trait.
     All human societies have customs and conventions defining what adornments may be worn by whom and on what occasions. Textiles have enabled us to indulge and elaborate this urge to remake ourselves as we imagine ourselves. Religionists have objected on many different grounds, but they all boil down to the same one: we use our clothing and other  adornments to create an image of ourselves as we wish to be seen and respected. Self-image is the essence of individuality. Religion always attempts to reduce the role of self-image because the more we measure our worth in terms we define ourselves, the less we heed the strictures of the religionists.
     So it should be no surprise that fashion, which is the purest mode of appearance as self-image, should everywhere be both followed and derided, if not worse. As usual, Lapham and his staff have assembled what amounts to materials for a course of study. That it is also vastly entertaining ensures that the sympathetic or curious reader will be well educated. Highly recommended. ****

Money and Ayn Rand

      Ayn Rand and her followers worship money. But on money, she is so mistaken that she's not even wrong. From the Ayn Rand lexicon (http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/money.html)::
     Money is the tool of men who have reached a high level of productivity and a long-range control over their lives. Money is not merely a tool of exchange: much more importantly, it is a tool of saving, which permits delayed consumption and buys time for future production. To fulfill this requirement, money has to be some material commodity which is imperishable, rare, homogeneous, easily stored, not subject to wide fluctuations of value, and always in demand among those you trade with. This leads you to the decision to use gold as money. Gold money is a tangible value in itself and a token of wealth actually produced. When you accept a gold coin in payment for your goods, you actually deliver the goods to the buyer; the transaction is as safe as simple barter. When you store your savings in the form of gold coins, they represent the goods which you have actually produced and which have gone to buy time for other producers, who will keep the productive process going, so that you’ll be able to trade your coins for goods any time you wish.
     This is of course nonsense. The only reason money can “buy time” is that there is surplus productive capacity. Money cannot create that surplus capacity, nor is it needed to ensure that it will be used. Humans have invented many ways of doing this without money. What you need is a technology that multiplies the effect of human work, and a system of customs (usually in the form of mutual obligations) that will ensure the surplus will be stored and traded. Fact is, even today much trade is done without money. The basic rule is "mutual obligation". Money is the abstraction of the IOU, which was is itself a record of a specific obligation.. It's a store of mutual obligation. not of wealth.
     And like practically everybody, Rand misquotes St. Paul’s comment on money:
So you think that money is the root of all evil? . . . Have you ever asked what is the root of money?
     In fact, St. Paul wrote, The love of money is the root of all evil. Look it up!
     Money is a way of making trade with strangers possible, and thereby making strangers mutually dependent. Very useful invention, IOW. E.g., just try to calculate how many people have been involved in producing a ball point pen and making it available to you. A stranger is someone to whom you owe nothing, and vice versa. This makes interaction between strangers dangerous. Hence, all societies have had to invent ways of making at least temporary mutual obligation possible. Think of "guest right", for example. So, why do all those strangers work to produce and deliver a cheap pen to you? Because money makes it not only possible to trade with people you will never meet, it makes it easy to do so.
     Nowadays, money trades are used to measure economic activity, which produces such incomplete, gappy data that it causes pernicious delusions. Even in our highly monetised economy, at least 1/3rd of economic exchange does not involve money. In pre-money times, that was 100%.
     Basic rule about money: money and wealth flow in opposite directions.
     I think everybody needs a good introductory survey course in anthropology. It might cure many people of the notion that our economic arrangements are somehow inevitable (or, gaak!, god given). For over 95% of our existence as a culture-creating species, we humans have had no money. Yet humans managed to produce the goods and provide the services they needed. It’s true that money, because it accelerated trade, and more importantly enabled trade with strangers, accelerated the creation of wealth. But trade, and its beneficial effects on wealth creation and cultural exchange, existed long before money.
     2013-03-11 & 2014-05-23

John Gribbin & Jeremy Cherfas. The First Chimpanzee (2001)

    John Gribbin & Jeremy Cherfas. The First Chimpanzee (2001) An extended (and unnecessarily long IMO) argument that humans, chimps, and gorillas shared a common hominid ancestor some 3 to 4 M years ago. In other words, the chimp-gorilla line did not split from the human line before the evolution of hominids, but afterwards. That would make chimps and gorillas hominids. This hypothesis was developed by Sarich and Wilson in the late 1960s, when the molecular clock was first calibrated.
     The argument rests on molecular biology, and the development of the molecular clock. It’s been shown that DNA/RNA and hence proteins evolve at surprisingly steady rates. This enables the calculation not of dates but of ratios of time spans, and hence of the relative positions of divergence points in the evolutionary trees of related species. Fossil evidence has calibrated the molecular clock pretty accurately for non-human genera, and for vertebrates and chordates generally, so that its application to the primate group should be a no-brainer. However, it seems that paleontologists don’t like to have their speculations checked by objective evidence from a different discipline. Even amongst themselves, they get rather testy when a colleague finds a fossil that requires “re-evaluation” of existing guesses.
     Along the way, Gribbin and Cherfas provide reams of interesting data, the most important of which is that the sum total of all humanoid fossils could be laid out on a dining room table. Most of them are teeth.
     Insofar as I can judge the evidence, I go with Gribbin and Cherfas. Well written but somewhat whingey in the final chapters, where they discuss the reception of the Sarich-Wilson hypothesis **½ (2007)

Mary Higgins Clark presents The Plot Thickens (1997)

     Mary Higgins Clark presents The Plot Thickens (1997) The common motif is a thick fog, a thick steak, and a thick book; 11 writers play with this motif in entertaining, and mostly forgettable, stories. Their quality ranges from * to ***, and I spent a couple pleasant hours all told reading these confections. (2002)

Guns, Germs, and Steel (book)

     Jared Diamond Guns, Germs, and Steel (1999) Diamond’s thesis is simple: in the long run, over several thousand years, what determined the dominance of Eurasia in human history was its early development of food production, and this in turn was governed by climate, ecology, and geography. These interacted. The ecology provided a large suite of plants and animals for domestication, and the geography gave Eurasia a wide band of similar climates within which to diffuse the new technology. By contrast, Africa and the Americas had a much smaller suite of plants and no large mammals suitable for domestication, while Australia had essentially none. Africa and the American continents also had climatic and geographic barriers to north-south diffusion of food production when it was developed.
     The thesis is persuasive, and Diamond’s point that long-term trends in history cannot have been influenced very much by culture or idiosyncratic accidents such as the rise of some anomalous individuals. He is also acutely aware of short term culturally determined twists in history. For example, the adoption of new technologies is influenced by a culture’s openness; but a culture that doesn’t quickly adopt new techniques will be overwhelmed (conquered, out-competed) by cultures that do. But individual decisions by rulers over large coherent cultures can have long-term consequences: China’s long decline in technology was caused by internal power struggles, and that’s why Western Eurasia dominates today rather than China. And so on.
     What might be called the E-C-G theory of history sounds like a theory that explains everything, but not quite. Diamond claims that it is a statistical theory: it can explain, and to some extent predict, large scale phenomena, but not small scale ones. In this respect human history is like all historical sciences, and Diamond insists that human history can be brought to a more objectively scientific state by learning from the  the methodologies of the other, simpler, historical sciences. These sciences are even capable of a kind of prediction: If theory X is true, then certain should be found in the historical record. In his defence of historical sciences Diamond doesn’t quite say what I want to say: Physics has been so spectacularly successful because it’s simple.
     A rich and suggestive book, made better by Diamond’s ability, unusual in an American academic, to write clearly. **** (2000)

The Meme Machine (book)

Susan Blackmore The Meme Machine (1999). Blackmore explicates an extended version of Dawkins notion of memes. It constitutes a rough theory of memes. She starts by observing that humans are imitators -- in fact, other animals hardly imitate at all, and even the ones who do (e.g., parrots) imitate a limited range of behaviours, whereas humans imitate just about everything. She thinks this behaviour a) needs explaining; and b) has consequences. The consequence she sees are memes (short for mimemes). A meme is whatever a human imitates. It can be relatively simple (e.g., a handshake) or quite complex (eg, a song.) Memes can combine into memeplexes.
     The most significant aspect of memes is that by being imitated they are replicated. If we now look at things from their point of view, they are replicators -- and replicators inevitably evolve. Blackmore’s explanation of evolution from this p.o.v is excellent. She draws various conclusions, some of which are clearly testable (and she says so) and some of which aren’t. The most interesting general conclusions are as follows:
     First, that human culture is an effect of memes' evolution. Those memes that replicate successfully constitute the culture. And the culture changes because of course the replicators continually evolve. Humans continually invent new behaviours, because imitations aren’t necessarily exact, and memes may be varied or combined with other memes. Any new memes or variations of existing ones may (not) be easy to copy (whatever that means), so some new memes will proliferate at the expense of existing memes. Thus the culture changes. This is most obvious in the case of fashion, but can be seen in other aspects of culture.
     Second, that memeplexes may include memes accidentally, in which case these memes survive not by intrinsic merit but because they are dragged along by the successful replicators.
     Third, that the most successful memeplexes include religions.
      Fourth, that when memes first appeared, that is when humans became better imitators, whatever genes were implicated both in imitation and in improved survival of the imitators would also spread. This, she thinks, may account for both the very large human brain and for language. Both the large brain and the language are good for memes.
     Fifth, that memes may proliferate to the detriment of their carriers, and may therefore in the long term destroy their own vehicles.
     Sixth, that the self or ‘I’ is an illusion, a memeplex. From this last conclusion she speculates further that it is possible to live without this illusion, and points to various mystical traditions that say much the same thing. Her last chapter is a re-writing of Buddhist doctrine, and therefore also resonates with Christian and other mysticisms.
     A very interesting book, which I shall reread.
****

No Kidding (Book Review)

Myrna Kostash No Kidding: Inside the World of Teenage Girls (1987) Kostash’s account rests on many interviews and many statistics. It’s a good, if often depressing, read. The anecdotes and stories give meaning to the statistics, which haven’t changed much in the last 25 years. She’s very good at giving us both sketches and portraits of the girls. She has the story-teller’s gifts of pacing, selecting the telling detail, and the illuminating quote. These gifts also, of course, mean she’s very good at shaping the narrative to suit her purposes. She’s a persuasive writer, and never more so than when she seems to be just telling a story.
     Kostash is a natural-born reporter, which means that she focusses on the unusual and the painful. I don’t doubt the truth of what she reports (insofar as a report is an honest account of the reporter’s perceptions and experience, it’s true). But I do doubt the impression that for most teenage girls, most of the time, life is more or less awful. My own observation is that teenagers are pretty resilient. Or maybe just short-term amnesic. Their time-horizon is short, their social perception ends a few inches outside their skin, they can empathise deeply and yet be blithely unable to imagine a  point of view different than their own.
     On the other hand, some of the people (groups) she identifies are in great need of help, support, and compassion. Far too many teenagers (not just girls) grow up dysfunctional in families whose members don’t or can’t treat each other as human beings. It’s not easy to figure out reforms that could ease the burden of abuse, but I think among them there must be changes in the environment within which teenagers try to navigate. That is, the environment must make some choices easier and other choices harder. A couple of small ones: make it more expensive to buy sugar drinks, and cheaper to buy fruit. Eliminate bells in schools (we did this for over ten years at the school I taught, and we had less tardiness than when we had bells).
     This book is often heart-breaking, occasionally funny, and sometimes hopeful. Recommended. ***
     Disclosure: Kostash was a student in a freshman English class I taught at the University of Alberta.

Book Review: The First Chimpanzee

The First Chimpanzee, by John Gribbin, & Jeremy Cherfas (2001)

An extended (and IMO unnecessarily long) argument that humans, chimps, and gorillas shared a common hominid ancestor some 3 to 4 million years ago. In other words, the chimp-gorilla line split from the human line after the evolution of hominids, not before. That would make chimps and gorillas hominids.

This hypothesis was developed by Sarich and Wilson in the late 1960s, when the molecular clock was first calibrated. The argument rests on molecular biology, and the development of the molecular clock in particular. It's been shown that DNA/RNA and hence proteins evolve at surprisingly steady rates. This enables the calculation not of dates but of ratios of time spans, and hence of the relative positions of divergence points in the evolutionary trees of related species. Add a few dates, and the ratios can be used to locate points in time. Fossil evidence has calibrated the molecular clock pretty accurately for non-human genera, and for vertebrates and chordates generally, so that its application to the primate group should be a no-brainer.

However, paleontologists don't like to have their speculations checked by external objective evidence. Even amongst themselves, they get rather testy when a colleague finds a fossil that requires "re-evaluation" of existing guesses.

Along the way, Gribbin and Cherfas provide reams of interesting data, the most important of which is that the sum total of all humanoid fossils could be laid out on a dining room table. Most of them are teeth. Insofar as I can judge the evidence, I go with Gribbin and Cherfas. Well written, but somewhat whingey in the final chapters, where they discuss the reception of the Sarich-Wilson hypothesis, which they support. So the rejection of that hypothesis becomes quite personal for them. **-½