The Meme Machine (book)

Susan Blackmore The Meme Machine (1999). Blackmore explicates an extended version of Dawkins notion of memes. It constitutes a rough theory of memes. She starts by observing that humans are imitators -- in fact, other animals hardly imitate at all, and even the ones who do (e.g., parrots) imitate a limited range of behaviours, whereas humans imitate just about everything. She thinks this behaviour a) needs explaining; and b) has consequences. The consequence she sees are memes (short for mimemes). A meme is whatever a human imitates. It can be relatively simple (e.g., a handshake) or quite complex (eg, a song.) Memes can combine into memeplexes.
     The most significant aspect of memes is that by being imitated they are replicated. If we now look at things from their point of view, they are replicators -- and replicators inevitably evolve. Blackmore’s explanation of evolution from this p.o.v is excellent. She draws various conclusions, some of which are clearly testable (and she says so) and some of which aren’t. The most interesting general conclusions are as follows:
     First, that human culture is an effect of memes' evolution. Those memes that replicate successfully constitute the culture. And the culture changes because of course the replicators continually evolve. Humans continually invent new behaviours, because imitations aren’t necessarily exact, and memes may be varied or combined with other memes. Any new memes or variations of existing ones may (not) be easy to copy (whatever that means), so some new memes will proliferate at the expense of existing memes. Thus the culture changes. This is most obvious in the case of fashion, but can be seen in other aspects of culture.
     Second, that memeplexes may include memes accidentally, in which case these memes survive not by intrinsic merit but because they are dragged along by the successful replicators.
     Third, that the most successful memeplexes include religions.
      Fourth, that when memes first appeared, that is when humans became better imitators, whatever genes were implicated both in imitation and in improved survival of the imitators would also spread. This, she thinks, may account for both the very large human brain and for language. Both the large brain and the language are good for memes.
     Fifth, that memes may proliferate to the detriment of their carriers, and may therefore in the long term destroy their own vehicles.
     Sixth, that the self or ‘I’ is an illusion, a memeplex. From this last conclusion she speculates further that it is possible to live without this illusion, and points to various mystical traditions that say much the same thing. Her last chapter is a re-writing of Buddhist doctrine, and therefore also resonates with Christian and other mysticisms.
     A very interesting book, which I shall reread.
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